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In this article,
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Supreme Court
reviewed state tax laws
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Constitution and
overruled its earlier
decisions in similar
cases. He also looks at a
single long-standing Supreme Court precedent
limiting federal income taxation under the
Constitution and at avoidance of state
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The U.S. Constitution reserves all powers to
the states or the people unless that power is
delegated expressly to the United States or
prohibited expressly to the states.1 The
Constitution delegates the power to impose taxes
to Congress: “The Congress shall have power to
lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises;
but all duties, imposts and excises shall be
2
uniform throughout the United States.” In
addition to uniformity, the Constitution requires
that “direct taxes . . . be apportioned among the

several states which may be included within this
3
union, according to their respective numbers,”
and that “no capitation, or other direct, tax shall be
laid, unless in proportion to the census or
4
enumeration.”
The 16th Amendment, which was adopted in
5
1913, permitted an income tax without
apportionment among the states. The amendment
was necessary for the enactment of a federal
income tax because the Supreme Court in Pollock v.
6
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Company invalidated an
1894 income tax as a direct tax on capital requiring
apportionment.7
While the Constitution prohibits federal
duties on exports but not imports,8 it gives
Congress exclusive jurisdiction over duties by
prohibiting states from imposing import or export
duties unless Congress consents.9 In other areas,
the Constitution does not limit the states’ power to
impose other taxes despite taxing power having
been delegated to the United States.
All 50 states have their own constitutions
confirming the state and local power to tax, but
taxpayer initiatives in some states have added
10
express constitutional limitations on taxation, for
example, the Hancock Amendment in Missouri11

3
4
5
6
7
8
9

1

U.S. Const. Amend. X (1789): “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”
2

U.S. Const. Art. I, section 8, cl. 1.

U.S. Const. Art. I, section 2, cl. 3.
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 9, cl. 4.
U.S. Const. Amend. XVI (1913).
157 U.S. 429 (1895), affirmed on rehearing, 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 2, cl. 3.
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 9, cl. 5.
U.S. Const. Art. I, section 10, cl. 2, 3.

10

Ariel Jurow Kleiman, “Tax Limits and the Future of Local
Democracy,” 133 Harv. L. Rev. 1884 (2020) (cataloguing and analyzing
state tax limitations).
11

Mo. Const. Art. X, section 16 et seq.
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12

and Proposition 13 in California. The Hancock
Amendment restricts the power of the Missouri
legislature and local jurisdictions to increase
existing taxes by more than an inflation
adjustment or to enact any new tax without
13
approval of the electorate by ballot referendum.
Proposition 13 limited increases in state ad
valorem property taxes on personal residences (a
principal source of local revenue supporting
schools and other government services) until the
property is sold in an arm’s-length transaction.
Then the tax could increase to an amount based
on the transfer price rather than the previous
owner’s historical cost.
The first part of this article provides
background of constitutional review of federal
and state laws and compares review in other
countries. The second part examines instances in
which the Supreme Court reviewed state taxing
laws for conflict with the Constitution and
overruled its earlier decisions in similar cases.
One case involving a poll or capitation tax worked
its way through the courts as the Constitution was
being amended to prevent the states from using a
poll tax. Another case, from 2018, resolved a longstanding tax collection and avoidance problem
with state sales taxes. The third part focuses on a
single long-standing Supreme Court precedent
limiting federal tax law under the Constitution,
which Congress increasingly has not followed.
The decision and recent congressional action is
contextual in the current discussions of other tax
proposals. The fourth part considers areas in
which constitutional limitations exist, but
legislatures and courts seem to have no interest in
addressing them. The fourth part is the
conclusion.
Constitutional Review of Taxes
14

In McCulloch v. Maryland, the U.S. Supreme
15
Court held that a state tax on a national bank

impermissibly interfered with the federal
government’s lawful exercise of its powers,
including powers “necessary and proper” to the
United States, even though the powers were not
expressly enumerated in the Constitution.16
McCulloch accepts the concurrent power of both
states and the federal government to tax, but its
limitation of the state’s power to tax federal
functions and, conversely, the federal
government’s power to tax states, is based in the
notion “that the power to tax involves the power
17
to destroy.” This decision led to development of
a doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunity.
The scope of that doctrine has contracted over the
years. The federal government may tax interest on
state and local obligations without running afoul
of intergovernmental tax immunity or the 10th
18
Amendment. States may tax salaries and
pensions of federal employees provided that they
do not treat those employees more harshly than
19
state employees.
Unlike Germany and other countries that
have a constitutional court with ultimate
authority over interpretation of the national
20
constitution, the U.S. Constitution leaves its
interpretation and application to the courts of
21
general jurisdiction. Review of statutes for
consistency with the Constitution is not
automatic22 but requires a case or controversy to
23
be presented to the courts. The case may be an

16

U.S. Const. Art. I, section 8, cl. 18: “to make all Laws which shall be
necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers,
and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of
the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”
17

McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, at 431.

18

South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988) (interest on unregistered
bonds taxable).
19

Dawson v. Steager, 586 U.S. ___ (2019) (citing McCulloch and its
progeny, the Court confirmed that a state could tax federal employees on
their pension payments from the United States but not more severely
than it taxed state retirees on their state pensions. Discrimination by the
state against federal employees was impermissible).
20

12

Cal. Const. Art. XIII A [tax limitation] (added June 6, 1978, by Prop.

13).

Art. 100, Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Basic
Law of the Federal Republic of Germany) requires the courts to refer
constitutional questions to the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Constitutional
Court).
21

13

Mo. Const. Art. X, section 18(e).

14

17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Compare the EU, where the central
authority lacks the power to tax but the member states impose a
contribution requirement for EU expenses on each member state.
European Parliament, Fact Sheets on the European Union, General Tax
Policy.
15

Supreme Court and Court refer to the U.S. Supreme Court.

1448

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (establishing the
power of the federal courts to review statutes for conflict with the
Constitution).
22

Compare France, in which the Conseil Constitutionnel has the
power to review legislation at enactment upon petition without prior
litigation. F.L. Morton, “Judicial Review in France: A Comparative
Analysis,” 36 Am. J. Comp. L. 89 (1988).
23

U.S. Const. Art. III, section 1, cl. 1.
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action for a declaratory judgment in an
appropriate instance.24 With limited exceptions,
the Supreme Court has discretion to accept or
reject review, including review of constitutional
issues, when litigants petition the Court for a writ
25
of certiorari to review a lower court decision. The
courts, including the Supreme Court, generally
are reticent on constitutional issues, and when
possible, resolve their cases without interpreting
the Constitution. The volume of constitutional
decisions relative to cases resolved on other
grounds tends to be lower in the United States
than in countries that have a dedicated
constitutional court and mandatory referral of
26
constitutional questions.
The Constitution limits the reach of state
constitutions on matters reserved to the United
States and, to a lesser degree, matters regarding
which there is concurrent jurisdiction, like
27
taxation. If state law, including tax law, conflicts
with the Constitution, the federal courts may
strike down the state law, but do so reluctantly.
Whenever possible federal courts defer to the
decisions of state legislatures if the state law
serves a rational, legitimate governmental
purpose. If, however, a state law
disproportionally disadvantages a suspect
classification of individuals — people of color, for
example — or undermines a taxpayer’s
fundamental rights like free exercise of religion, a
federal court is likely to apply a more demanding
review standard. The court may require the state
to demonstrate that (1) the state has a compelling
need for the law, and (2) the state cannot meet that

need with a law that does not harm the suspect
group or limit fundamental rights.28 In Harper29 a
tax imperiled the taxpayer’s fundamental right to
vote. The state could not demonstrate a
compelling need for payment of the tax to secure
the right to vote so the Court intervened and
struck it down.
Even arguments based on fundamental rights
are often unsuccessful. For example, in Nordlinger
v. Hahn30 a taxpayer challenged Proposition 1331
32
under the federal equal protection clause. Equal
protection is the United States’ manifestation of
the concept of equal rights. Equal protection does
not demand precision in distribution of rights but
requires only reasonable basis for laws that have
disparate impacts on individuals or groups. If the
law affects a suspect class of individuals
adversely or limits a fundamental right, courts
may apply heightened scrutiny. With property
values increasing rapidly in California, a new
resident is likely to pay a substantially higher
property tax than a neighbor who has lived in
their home for a long period, even though the
homes are substantially identical. The taxpayer in
Nordlinger argued that Proposition 13 led to
substantial disparities in ad valorem real estate
taxes between residences owned by long-term
owners and new buyers, thereby infringing on her
fundamental right to travel because the
substantial increase in property taxes following
her purchase of a residence impinges on her
ability to relocate to California.33 The Supreme
Court rejected the right-to-travel claim because
the taxpayer was living in a rented apartment in
California already, and applied the minimal
rational basis review standard. It held that the
proposition did not violate equal protection

24

E.g., the recent decision in South Dakota v. Wayfair, 585 U.S. ___, 138
S. Ct. 2080 (2018), discussed infra in text accompanying note 42 was a
declaratory judgment action brought by the state of South Dakota.
25

Generally, on certiorari, see U.S. Courts, Supreme Court
Procedures.
26

Compare Germany, supra note 20. See generally Henry Ordower,
“Horizontal and Vertical Equity in Taxation as Constitutional Principles:
Germany and the United States Contrasted,” 7 Fla. Tax Rev. 259 at 261-4
(2006) (hereinafter Ordower, “Horizontal and Vertical Equity”). For a
broader collection of U.S. case law addressing the legislative power to
tax, see Tracy A. Kaye and Stephen W. Mazza, “United States — National
Report: Constitutional Limitations of the Legislative Power to Tax in the
United States,” 15 Mich. St. J. of Int’l. L. 481 (2007).
27

McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (prohibiting state taxation of a
federal bank).

28

This article refers to such review as heightened scrutiny.

29

Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966), discussed
infra note 37 and accompanying text.
30
31

505 U.S. 1 (1992).
Supra note 12 and accompanying text.

32

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, section 1: “nor shall any State . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
33

Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (holding a one-year waiting
period to qualify for welfare benefits when moving to a new state
unduly restricted the individual’s right to travel and establish residence
in a new location).
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because the tax structure served the rational state
interest of maintaining neighborhood stability.34
Overruling Precedent
Fundamental Rights: Poll Taxes and Voter
Suppression
35

In Breedlove the Supreme Court upheld a poll
(capitation) tax applicable to all adult males but
only to women who registered to vote. While the
legislation did not expressly state that its goal was
to suppress voting by people of color, the effect of
the tax fell on the state’s impoverished Black
population and prevented many from exercising
their voting rights. The Court concluded that even
though the male taxpayers in Breedlove suffered
discrimination based on their sex, adult men were
not a disadvantaged and suspect class of litigants
entitled to heightened scrutiny, so the state need
only have a rational basis for the statute to
withstand challenge under the equal protection
clause.36 The Court upheld the tax in Breedlove
because it served the rational state purpose of
raising revenue.
The Court overruled its Breedlove decision
37
with Harper, in which it applied the
Constitution’s equal protection clause to
invalidate a poll tax. Failure to pay the poll tax
38
barred the taxpayer from voting. The Court
concluded that voting — as a fundamental right
— required heightened scrutiny in its review of
the state tax, and held that voting rights must not
depend on the voter’s ability to pay the tax. Even
acknowledging the equal protection violation,
Justice Hugo Black dissented, confirming a
commitment to the principle of stare decisis even in
the face of historical error by arguing that the

Court should follow its precedent because the
Constitution had not changed.39
The victory for voting rights in Harper and the
24th Amendment proved pyrrhic. While taxes no
longer played a role in voter suppression,
gerrymandering of representative districts, voter
identification laws, purging of voting rolls, and a
variety of voter intimidation methods affect
voting by people of color, especially in the
southern United States.40 The issue of the
constitutional permissibility of partisan
41
gerrymandering remains uncertain.
State Borders and Use Taxes: Due Process and
Commerce Clause Limitations
42

In 2018 the Supreme Court in Wayfair
decided that a state may require a vendor in
another state and having no physical presence in
the taxing state to collect use tax from buyers on
items the vendor ships to them from outside their
state of residence. The vendor must remit the
collected tax to the buyer’s state. The decision
43
overruled two earlier precedents as it addressed
the authority of one state to reach across state
lines to compel tax-related action in another state.
Most states impose a tax on the sale and
delivery of goods in the state. The states collect the
sales tax by requiring vendors in the state to
collect the tax at the point of sale and remit the tax
to the state. In instances in which the buyer is not
a state resident and the seller ships the goods to
the buyer at a location outside the state, the state
generally does not impose its sales tax.44 States
imposing a sales tax also impose a

34

Nordlinger, 505 U.S. 1 at 13-14. The Court noted that the new
purchaser had no right to rely on the historical tax rate on property the
individual wished to acquire. The economics are also uncertain. The
market is likely to discount the value of a residence with low property
taxes when the taxes will increase substantially after sale. The discount
might be as great as the present value of the increased taxes for several
years.
35

Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937).

36

U.S. Const. Amendment XIV, section 1.

37

Harper, 383 U.S. 663.

38

40

Vann R. Newkirk II, “Voter Suppression Is the New Old Normal,”
The Atlantic, Oct. 24, 2018.
41

Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill, No. 18-281, 580 U.S. ___
137 S. Ct. 788 (2019)(dismissing appeal of lower court ruling finding
gerrymandering unconstitutional).
42

Wayfair, 585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2080.

43

U.S. Const. Amend. XXIV, ratified in 1964, prohibits denial of
franchise in any federal election because a voter fails to pay any tax. The
amendment did not apply in Harper because the tax was imposed before
the amendment, but its ratification may have influenced the court’s
decision.

1450

39

Of course, Black knew that the 24th Amendment would prevent
future poll taxes.

National Bellas Hess Inc. v. Department of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S.
753 (1967); and Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
44

State requirements vary in instances in which the buyer is
physically present but has the seller ship the goods to an out-of-state
person who may be the buyer.
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complementary use tax on goods shipped into the
state for use there.45 Collection of the use tax has
been problematic. While the consumer of the
goods has an obligation to pay the tax, many
consumers do not pay voluntarily, and the state
lacks the ability to identify all goods shipped to
consumers in the state. Until Wayfair, states could
not simplify use tax collection by imposing the
burden to collect on vendors having no physical
presence in the state, as earlier Supreme Court
decisions determined.
When Illinois sought to compel out-of-state
vendors to collect a use tax on sales of goods
shipped to Illinois, a Missouri vendor with no
physical presence but an active mail-order
business in Illinois challenged the collection
obligation. The Supreme Court held in National
46
Bellas Hess that under both the due process
47
clause and the commerce clause48 of the
Constitution, the vendor’s lack of physical
presence in the state precluded imposition of the
collection obligation on the out-of-state vendor.
Finding that the requirements of the due process
and the commerce clauses were closely linked, the
Court concluded that the tax collection obligation
imposed a duty without the state having
jurisdiction over the out-of-state vendor and
interfered with interstate commerce. Power to
regulate interstate commerce belongs exclusively
to Congress.
Later, in Quill,49 the Supreme Court
abandoned due process as a barrier to imposing
tax collection responsibility on an out-of-state
vendor. The Court concluded that it would not be
fundamentally unfair to an out-of-state vendor to
carry tax collection responsibility. The Court
discussed the development of due process
thinking and decided that the out-of-state
business availed itself of the markets in the state
by soliciting business there. However, in the

45

The combination of sales and use taxes produces revenue for the
state and local governments. Unlike many countries, the United States
does not have a centrally administered consumption tax like a VAT,
revenue from which the central administrator might share with local
governments.

absence of physical presence in the state, the
Court found that the tax collection obligation
intruded on interstate commerce and,
accordingly, violated the commerce clause. The
Court concluded that regulation of interstate
commerce belonged to Congress and Congress
had the power to impose the tax collection
responsibility on out-of-state vendors.
50
In Wayfair the Court determined that it erred
when it concluded that physical presence in the
state was essential to the use tax collection
obligation. Instead, only nexus with the state was
required and the vendor’s nexus was its use of
various means to target sales efforts to and
capture sales into the state by using the internet
and other means of communication with state
residents. The vendor was engaged in commerce
in the state albeit without a physical presence.
Requiring the vendor to collect and remit state
taxes on goods it sold and shipped to customers in
the state did not intrude on interstate commerce
in violation of the commerce clause. The Court
acknowledged that the state may regulate the
impact of interstate commerce if it does not
51
discriminate against out-of-state vendors and
has a rational basis for the regulation or tax in this
case. The necessary rational basis is the loss of tax
revenue on sales because consumers do not pay
the use tax on out-of-state purchases they bring
into or have delivered to them in the state, and
there is no practical means to collect the use tax in
most instances. Economic nexus suffices for a
collection obligation considering the volume of
commerce conducted over the internet, where
concepts of physical presence are easily
manipulated and avoided even in the presence of
substantial activity over the internet into the
taxing state.
Wayfair may be a sensible business decision
for the digital age when physical presence is
mutable, and frequently means little in terms of
economic activity. Nevertheless, the decision is
surprising insofar as the Court in Quill concluded
that it need not address practical policy
considerations concerning the digital application

46

386 U.S. 753.

47

U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, section 1.

48

U.S. Const. Art. I, section 8, cl. 3: Granting Congress the power “to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States.”
49

504 U.S. 298.

50

585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2080.

51

E.g., Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869 (1985)
(invalidating a gross premiums tax in Alabama that discriminated
against out-of-state insurers).
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of the commerce clause because Congress had the
power to resolve the issue and authorize states to
require out-of-state vendors to collect and remit
52
use tax. Despite Congress’s failure to act, the
Court chose to accept control over the matter as it
applied a practical business standard to the
limitations of the Constitution. The Court
overruled its long-standing precedents.53 The
physical presence test permitted vendors to select
their locations and structure their businesses to
avoid the collection responsibility while enabling
consumers to avoid state use taxes. With so much
commerce using the internet, the physical
presence test gave out-of-state vendors a material
advantage over in-state vendors. Digital presence
in a state sufficed to satisfy commerce clause
limitations. Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr.,
however, joined by three other justices, dissented,
arguing that the Court should not overrule its
commerce clause precedents even if incorrect. It is
Congress’s responsibility to evaluate the
economic and policy impacts of a change in the
rule. Failure of Congress to act when it has the
power to act does not justify the Court’s changing
54
the outcome.
Wayfair raises the question of whether a state
might reach across an international border to
compel a vendor to collect use tax on its behalf —
an important question for sales of products,
including online sales of purely digital products
having no physical substance. Does international
marketing or use of the international banking
system for payment provide sufficient nexus to
support imposition of a collection obligation on
foreign vendors by local taxing authorities? If the
answer is yes, will internet vendors eschew
international banking in favor of cryptocurrencies
to hide from taxing authorities? And how will
states enforce that collection obligation? In
domestic contexts, the federal and state courts are
available to assist in collection because the
decision is the law of the land. Courts in other
countries, however, are free to reject the
jurisdictional conclusions of the U.S. Supreme
Court.

55

The Foreign Accounts Tax Compliance Act
demonstrates how one taxing authority might
compel action across national borders where it
otherwise lacks jurisdiction. Under FATCA the
United States may disqualify foreign financial
institutions from favored status under U.S. tax
law. Foreign financial institutions often
participate in reduced withholding opportunities
on U.S. investments if they certify that their
underlying investors meet the reduced
withholding requirements. As a condition of
participation in that program, FATCA requires
the qualifying institutions to assist the United
States in identifying U.S. taxpayers who invest in
56
or through the foreign financial institutions.
Noncompliant institutions risk losing preferred
reporting status regarding unrelated investments.
Institutions in jurisdictions with financial secrecy
protections have begun to reject investments from
U.S. persons so they do not have to choose
between financial secrecy and loss of preferred
reporting status for their non-U.S. investors for
whom the institution invests in the United States.
It seems less likely that a state might have a
comparable benefit to offer foreign vendors to
induce use tax collection.
Borders and Taxing Jurisdiction
Wayfair57 retreats from constitutional
limitations on state cross-border taxing powers
and, based on a broad open-ended nexus concept,
substitutes jurisdiction to regulate sales activities
of out-of-state vendors when the vendors enter in
state markets. While permitting states to impose
the obligation to collect the taxes from the
vendors’ customers, Wayfair does not empower
states to impose taxes on the out-of-state vendors
that have no physical presence in the taxing state.
The Supreme Court confirmed the continuing
58
vitality of the due process clause as a limitation

55

P.L. 111-147, 124 Stat. 71 (2010).

56

52

Quill, 504 U.S. at 318.

53

Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2080, 2097. The South Dakota Supreme Court
had followed U.S. Supreme Court precedents and ruled against the state.
54

Id. at 2101-2105 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).

1452

IRC section 1471 (requiring U.S. withholding agents to withhold 30
percent of payments made to foreign financial institutions that are not in
compliance with FATCA reporting obligations).
57
58

585 U.S. ___, 138 S. Ct. 2080.
U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, section 1.

TAX NOTES FEDERAL, AUGUST 24, 2020
®
Electronic
available
at:content,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648673
For morecopy
Tax Notes
Federal
please visit www.taxnotes.com.

© 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

VIEWPOINT

on the state’s power to tax out-of-state persons in
Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust.59 In that
case it held that a trust beneficiary’s residence in a
state did not provide a sufficient jurisdictional
basis for taxing an out-of-state trust’s income. The
beneficiary received no income from the trust and
had no power to require the trust to distribute
income to the beneficiary.
Legislating Beyond Precedent
A few years after ratification of the 16th
60
Amendment, the Supreme Court invalidated a
statute that included stock dividends in income
for tax purposes. The Court held that a corporate
dividend declared and paid in the issuing
corporation’s own shares was not income under
61
the amendment. The decision rested on the
observation that after the dividend the
shareholder had nothing more than or different
from what the shareholder had before the
dividend. The shareholder’s proportional voting
and participation rights remained unchanged.
Unlike a cash distribution that increases the
separate assets of the shareholder and decreases
the assets of the corporation, a stock dividend
changes nothing.
While the Court refined the limitations of the
holding in subsequent cases62 and expanded on
the language in the decision that suggested
63
income must come from capital or labor, the
Court has never overruled the decision. Macomber
holds that, as a matter of constitutional law,
separation of something from the capital or

exchange of the property for cash or other
property is a condition to inclusion in income.64
Distribution of cash or property by the
corporation other than additional shares of the
same stock is income to the shareholder. A sale or
other disposition of the corporate shares results in
gain or loss includable in the income of the
shareholder. Distribution of additional shares of
stock is not income.
After Macomber, commentators characterized
realization as an administrative rule of
convenience rather than a constitutional
requirement for inclusion of gain and
recommended various permutations of taxation
65
without realization. Congress has enacted
several statutes that include unrealized gain in
income under specific circumstances to limit
opportunities for tax avoidance. No taxpayer or
interest group has launched a serious
constitutional challenge to any of the statutes.
Without a case or controversy, the Court has not
confronted the constitutional question and the
statutes remain in force.66
The first of the inclusions without realization
was the foreign personal holding company rules.67
Under those statutes, a U.S. person who was a
shareholder in a closely held foreign corporation
holding primarily passive investment assets68 was
taxable as if the corporation distributed its income
69
as dividends. The statute prevented individuals
from using foreign corporations to defer inclusion
in income of the return on their investments with
an “incorporated (foreign) pocketbook.” The
64

59

North Carolina Department of Revenue v. The Kimberly Rice Kaestner
1992 Family Trust, 588 U.S. ___ (2019).
60

U.S. Const. Amend. XVI.

61

Eisner v. Macomber, 252 US 189 (1920). Shareholders own a greater
number of shares than before the dividend, but their proportional
interests are unchanged. The market value of a shareholder’s total
shareholdings may increase because of the stock dividend because the
market may perceive the stock dividend as indicating that the
corporation is doing well so that the share price rises. Alternatively, the
market availability of a greater number of shares outstanding at a
reduced dilution adjusted price per share increases demand for the
shares at a lower price.
62

E.g., Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936) (common share
dividend with respect to preferred shares was taxable).

The exchange of property for cash or other property is referred to
as realization, IRC section 1001(a). Gain or loss realized from the sale or
exchange of property is recognized; that is, included in the taxpayer’s
income under IRC section 1001(c), unless another provision in the code
permits the taxpayer to defer or exclude the recognized gain or loss.
Many exceptions exist including IRC section 351, which permits transfer
of property to a corporation in exchange for corporate shares.
65

Stanley S. Surrey, “The Supreme Court and the Federal Income Tax:
Some Implications of the Recent Decisions,” 35 Ill. L. Rev. 779, 782-85
(1941) (administrative convenience). The literature favoring a shift away
from realization-based taxation is extensive: David J. Shakow, “Taxation
Without Realization: A Proposal for Accrual Taxation,” 134 U. Pa. L. Rev.
1111 (1986); Jeff Strnad, “Periodicity and Accretion Taxation: Norms and
Implementation,” 99 Yale L.J. 1817 (1990); and Deborah H. Schenk, “An
Efficiency Approach to Reforming a Realization-Based Tax,” 57 Tax L.
Rev. 503 (2004).
66

See discussion of the case or controversy requirement, supra note 23
and accompanying text.
67
68

63

Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955) (punitive
damages are income).

69

IRC section 551 et seq. enacted 1937, repealed 2004.
IRC section 553 (repealed).
IRC section 551(b) (repealed).
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personal holding company provisions that
imposed a penalty tax on a U.S. incorporated
70
pocketbook did not violate Macomber because
they taxed the corporation and did not impute a
nonexistent dividend. A penalty tax could not
apply to a foreign corporation because the United
States did not have the power to tax a foreign
corporation without a U.S. presence, but it did
have the power to tax the corporation’s U.S.
owners. A single reported decision rejected a
challenge to the foreign personal holding
company tax on the shareholders but on grounds
other than the imputed dividend, and relating to
the shareholder’s inability to use blocked
71
currency in the United States. When Congress
later enacted another antiabuse structure for U.S.
owners of a foreign corporation, Congress
avoided imputing a nonexistent dividend and
taxed the foreign corporation’s income directly to
the U.S. shareholders.72 Disregarding the
existence of the foreign corporation regarding
income abusively directed to the foreign
corporation was a more acceptable mechanism
because it redirected income to its actual owner.73
Not until 1984 did Congress enact a statute
requiring taxpayers to include in their incomes
the appreciation or depreciation in the value of
74
their property without realization. The statute
requires taxpayers to mark to market
commodities and financial investment positions
annually and include any change in the value
during the year in income without an event of
realization like a sale of the position. Industry
participants offered no resistance to annual
inclusion because they probably benefited from
75
the statute. Many industry participants did not
hold the applicable positions for long periods. The
statute defined includable gain from marking to
market as 60 percent favored long-term capital

gain usually requiring a one-year holding period
and 40 percent short-term capital gain without
regard to the taxpayer’s actual holding period.
There was no constitutional challenge to the
statute.76 The more recently enacted expatriation
77
tax uses the mark-to-market inclusion
mechanism. The expatriation tax requires
individuals who relinquish their U.S. citizenship
or — if noncitizen residents, their right to reside in
the United States — to mark all their property to
market and include gain or loss in income when
they expatriate. The tax is an antiabuse provision
78
and has not been challenged constitutionally.
79
The recently enacted transition tax is not an
antiabuse provision but facilitates the change to
limited territoriality in U.S. taxation.80 The tax is
imposed one time and has stretched the limits of
extranational taxation. It taxes earnings
accumulated by a foreign corporation over
81
several years to its U.S. shareholders without the
foreign corporation making any distributions or
the U.S. shareholders taking any action regarding
the accumulated foreign income. Like the
shareholders receiving the stock dividend in
82
Macomber, the shareholders are taxed even
though they have nothing different from what
they had before the tax imposition and do not
even receive a stock dividend. After the one-time
tax, distributions out of foreign earnings of
foreign corporations to their U.S. shareholders
83
that are corporations are free from U.S. tax. A
constitutional challenge to the tax seems unlikely
because the tax is imposed at a significantly
reduced rate, can be spread over several years,
and enables major corporations with foreign

76

IRC section 475 (requiring dealers in securities to mark their
positions to market also drew no challenge because it included
simplified opportunities to identify securities held for investment and
exempt from marking to market).
77

IRC section 877A (enacted 2010).

78

70

IRC section 541 et seq.

71

Eder v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 138 F.2d 27 (2d Cir. 1943).

Ordower, “The Expatriation Tax, Deferrals, Mark to Market, the
Macomber Conundrumand Doubtful Constitutionality,” 15 Pitt. Tax Rev. 1
(2017).
79

72

IRC section 951 (taxing U.S. shareholders on some income of
controlled foreign corporations) (enacted 1962).
73

Compare IRC section 482 (power to reallocate income and
deductions between taxpayers to clearly reflect income) and such cases
as Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111 (1930) (income from services taxable to the
individual who provided the services and earned the income).
74

IRC section 1256 (enacted 1984).

The United States taxes its citizens, residents, and domestic
corporations on their worldwide income. IRC section 61; and reg. section
1.1-1(b).
81

A U.S. shareholder is a term of art meaning a U.S. person owning
10 percent or more of the voting power or value of a foreign (non-U.S.)
corporation.
82

75

Ordower, “Revisiting Realization: Accretion Taxation, the
Constitution, Macomber, and Mark to Market,” 13 Va. Tax Rev. 1 (1993).

1454

IRC section 965 as added by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act (P.L. 115-97).

80

83

Macomber, 252 U.S. 189.
IRC section 245A (100 percent dividends received deduction).
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subsidiaries to repatriate foreign earnings at a low
U.S. tax cost without restrictions on how the U.S.
corporate shareholders use those repatriated
84
earnings.
Discussions in the media, among scholars,
and in Congress regarding additional tax law
changes recommend taking the United States still
further from the realization limitations of
85
Macomber and apportionment clause limitation.
For example, several members of Congress have
proposed a wealth tax — seemingly at odds with
86
the apportionment clause and not a tax on
income — applicable annually on the value of the
individual’s property. Proposals would exclude
individuals with property valued at less than an
asset threshold so that the tax would shift more of
the overall tax burden to wealthy residents and
87
U.S. citizens. If enacted (and chances of
enactment are low), the tax would be a direct tax
on capital.
The Supreme Court held such a direct tax
unconstitutional long ago,88 but in this new era
when constitutional limitations no longer seem a
barrier, a wealth tax might not be challenged.
Other proposals would expand annual marking
to market to all securities and possibly other
89
property. Those proposals are consistent with
unchallenged statutes already applicable to
90
91
commodities and at expatriation even if their
enactment seems contrary to Macomber.

Ignoring the Constitution
The preceding parts of this section suggest
that the U.S. Constitution and possibly state
constitutions play only a small role in
constraining legislative action under the
legislature’s taxing authority. Constitutions
primarily loom in the background, informing
legislative reflection and possibly encouraging
legislative restraint, but rarely becoming an
impediment when the legislature chooses a
course of action. Supreme Court decisions on tax
matters provide some guidance to legislatures but
it tends to be vague.
Discrimination in Taxation
While the Supreme Court has determined that
a state may not tax an out-of-state business more
92
than a comparable in-state business, or a federal
retiree less favorably than a state retiree,93 the
Court defers to the legislatures regarding the
distributional characteristics of the tax structures
94
if there is some rational basis for the tax. The
Court has not determined that the Constitution
requires a taxing system to embed the equality95
based principles of horizontal or vertical equity.
Seemingly like taxpayers need not be taxed alike
if any rational governmental purpose for
96
distinguishing them exists and progressive
taxation based on ability-to-pay principles may be
appealing to scholars but is not constitutionally
97
required. Even the new 20 percent deduction for
qualified business income is unlikely to be
challenged successfully despite its classifications

84

Ordower, “Abandoning Realization and the Transition Tax: Toward
a Comprehensive Tax Base,” 67 Buffalo L. Rev. 1371 (2019). And see Hank
Adler and Lacy Willis, “The Worst Statutory Precedent in Over 100
Years,” Tax Notes, Sept. 3, 2018, p. 1413; and Mark E. Berg and Fred
Feingold, “The Deemed Repatriation Tax — A Bridge Too Far?” Tax
Notes, Mar. 5, 2018, p. 1345, for arguments that the transition tax is
unconstitutional because it is not apportioned as required by U.S. Const.
Art. I, section 9, cl. 4. A constitutional challenge to the transition tax is
pending in a district court but seems unlikely to succeed. Moore v. United
States, No. 2:19-cv-01539 (W.D. Wash. 2020).
85

U.S. Const. Art. I, section 9, cl. 4.

86

Id.

87

Neil Irwin, “Elizabeth Warren Wants a Wealth Tax. How Would
That Even Work?” The New York Times, Feb. 18, 2019.
88

Pollock, 157 U.S. 429.

89

David Leonhardt, “A Man With a Plan for Inequality: Let the Rich
Be Taxed the Way Everyone Else Is,” The New York Times, Apr. 3, 2019. See
Ordower, “Abandoning Realization,” supra note 84.

92

Camps Newfound/Owatonna Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564
(1997) (property tax exemption discriminating against out-of-state
residents is impermissible).
93

Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916) (rejecting
equal protection and due process challenges to a progressive income
tax). In Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940), the Court stated: “The
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most
explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive
discrimination against particular persons and classes.”
95

Compare the decision of the German Constitutional Court
requiring horizontal equity in taxation but requiring only that “taxation
of higher incomes be measured against taxation of lower incomes
(vertical equity).” BVerfGE 107, 27, 46 (Dec. 4, 2002), translation and
discussion from Ordower, “Horizontal and Vertical Equity,” supra note
26, at 304.
96

90

IRC section 1256.

Dawson, 586 U.S. ___ (2019), text accompanying note 12.

94

Nordlinger, 505 U.S. 1, and text accompanying note 29.

97

Walter J. Blum and Harry Kalven Jr., “The Uneasy Case for
Progressive Taxation,” 19 The U. Chi. L. Rev. 417 (1952).

91

IRC section 877A.
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of taxpayers, favoring self-employed individuals
over employees and disfavoring services
98
performed in some professions.
Scholars observe that the federal income tax
discriminates racially in its delivery of the tax
99
benefits associated with home ownership. The
bias in delivery of the tax benefits is not explicit in
the statute. The statute allowing a deduction for
mortgage interest, for example, is neutral and
applies to all taxpayers.100 It permits a deduction
for residence interest when other personal interest
101
is not deductible. In addition to the mortgage
interest deduction, the U.S. income tax does not
include the use value of homes in the income of
the homeowner and applies a favorable rate of
taxation to gain on the sale of property. Both offer
significant tax advantages to homeowners
102
relative to renters. Renters are taxable on the
income they use to pay rent103 but owners are not
taxed on their use of their owned property. In
effect owners pay for use of a residence with
pretax dollars and renters with after-tax dollars.
Yet, participation of people of color in the owned
rather than rental housing market tends to be low
104
nationally relative to white taxpayers. Absent an
express racial classification in allowance of tax
benefits, the Constitution does not prevent the
discriminatory impact of the tax law.

105

and state. A governmental grant to a religious
organization to enable it to build or improve a
facility for a religious purpose may be
impermissible and inconsistent with the
establishment clause,106 yet recently the Supreme
Court held that a governmental agency may
provide monetary assistance to a religious
organization to improve a children’s playground
107
adjacent to a religious facility. That decision may
open the door to direct governmental payments to
support religious functions or it may be an
aberration because the playground improvement
subsidy was designed for children’s safety
regardless of religious affiliation or promotion.
From the tax perspective, a legislative decision
to provide a tax benefit to religious organizations
is acceptable as long as the enabling statute does
108
not discriminate by religious sect. Accordingly,
a tax exemption for a religious organization is
109
permissible. In fact, taxing religious institutions
may be problematic. The state would have the
power to destroy the institution if the state were to
impose excessive and destructive taxation.110 The
exclusion from gross income of a housing
111
allowance paid to “ministers of the gospel”

Church and State Separation
From its beginning as an independent nation,
the United States required separation of church
105

98

U.S. Const. Amend. I reads in part: “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof.”

99

Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (stating that the state
or federal government may not subsidize a religious facility but holding
that the government may provide children transportation at government
expense to religious schools as it provides transportation to public
schools).

100

Trinity Lutheran Church of Columbia Inc. v. Comer, 582 U.S. ___, 137
S. Ct. 2012 (2017).

IRC section 199A, added by the TCJA, allows a deduction for
qualified business income but excludes services performed as an
employee and income from specified service businesses under section
199A(d). For commentary, see Edward Kleinbard, “Congress’ Worst Tax
Idea Ever,” The Hill, Mar. 25, 2019.
E.g., Dorothy A. Brown, “Shades of the American Dream,” 87 Wash.
U. L. Rev. 329 (2010) (arguing implicit bias in delivery of tax benefits).
IRC section 163(h)(2)(D) (deduction for qualified residence
interest). The deduction is an itemized deduction that is less likely to
offer a tax benefit after the TCJA because fewer taxpayers will itemize
their deductions under the now larger standard deduction of IRC section
63.
101

IRC section 163(h) (personal interest disallowed).

102

Ordower, “Income Imputation: Toward Equal Treatment of
Renters and Owners,” in Controversies in Tax Law: A Matter of Perspective
(2015).
103

IRC section 262 (residential rent is a personal and family expense
and not deductible).
104

Jung Hyun Choi and Laurie Goodman, “What Explains the
Homeownership Gap Between Black and White Young Adults?” Urban
Institute (Nov. 20, 2018).
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106

107

108

Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (denying a
deduction for Scientology auditing payments because the donor of the
payments receives identifiable services in exchange, and adding that the
charitable contribution deduction for contributions to religious
organizations is long-standing and not an establishment clause
violation).
109

Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
Compare, McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, and accompanying text at
note 10.
110

C.f. McCulloch 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, and accompanying text at
note 10.
111

IRC section 107 (exclusion of lodging and an allowance for lodging
used for that purpose). Ministers of the gospel is neutral and includes
individuals serving ministerial functions in all religions.
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112

withstood a challenge in the Seventh Circuit.
Other taxpayers who are not ministers paid by a
religious organization may not exclude housing
allowances and may exclude only lodging
provided in kind for the employer’s convenience
113
and on their employer’s premises.
The Supreme Court has stated that the
indirect subsidization of religious organizations
through the charitable contribution deduction
does not violate the establishment clause as long
as the subsidy is equally available to all religions
114
institutions. Exempting a religious organization
from tax, providing school transportation, and
protecting children from injury on playgrounds
are different from the government subsidizing
donations to religious organizations. The
charitable contribution deduction statute permits
donors to direct part of the amount they
otherwise would be obligated to pay in tax to the
religious organization when they deduct the
contributions they make to religious
115
organizations. The neutrality of the statute
rather than its delivery of a subsidy is the focus of
the Supreme Court’s dictum. The effect of a
charitable contribution deduction is a subsidy
from the government to the religious institution
equal to the tax benefit the donor derives from the
116
contribution.
Congress included the subsidy of the
deduction in the tax law despite the constitutional
limitation of the establishment clause. The
Supreme Court extended permissibility of

112

Gaylor v. Mnuchin, 919 F.3d 420 (7th Cir. 2019). The court found a
sufficient secular purpose in the exclusion despite its effect to support
religion. The court identified three secular purposes for the legislation:
“to eliminate discrimination against ministers, to eliminate
discrimination between ministers, and to avoid excessive entanglement
with religion.” For the first purpose, only some ministers would fit the
general exclusion under IRC section 119. Similarly, within the class of
ministers, those receiving housing would exclude its value under section
119 while those receiving money would not.
113

IRC section 119.

114

Hernandez, 490 U.S. 680 (the statement is dictum and not a holding
of the Court because there was no challenge to the deductibility of
charitable contributions to churches).
115

IRC section 170 (c) (allowing a deduction for contributions to some
organizations, including religious organizations).
116

E.g., if a taxpayer whose income is subject to 20 percent tax makes
a charitable contribution, the 20 percent tax on an equivalent amount of
the taxpayer’s income is redirected by the taxpayer to the donee. Of a
$100 contribution the taxpayer provides $80 and the government $20.
Details of the operation of the charitable contribution deduction are
complicated by computational limitations in the IRC that are beyond the
scope of this chapter.

subsidies to religious education by ruling in
Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue117 that a
state providing a tax credit benefit for private
education must also include religious schools
despite the Montana Supreme Court’s ruling to
the contrary. Commentators view the decision as
far-reaching approval of government subsidies to
religious schools that may threaten funding for
public education by diverting governmental
118
funds to private religious schools.
State Constitutional Limitations on Taxes and Tax
Increases
Several states have amended their
119
constitutions to include tax limitations. The
limitations require an affirmative vote by the
citizens before the governmental unit may
increase a tax or enact a new tax. Both the state
and its underlying municipal governments and
120
agencies have found it to be difficult to persuade
voters to approve increases to provide the state or
local government with the needed revenue to
fund specified governmental services. In
Missouri, the limitation includes governmental
121
agency fees and taxes. The constitutional
provision prohibits tax increases without the vote
but does not require a rebate of taxes collected in
122
violation of the constitution unless the state
government collects excess revenues. The state
must rebate excess state revenue through an
123
income tax refund.
Circumventing the constitutional limitation
on taxes, municipal governments use their police
power to produce revenue. The municipal
executive provides the chief of police a revenue
target and the chief of police instructs police
officers to increase traffic and other offense

117

591 U.S. ___ (2020).

118

Adam Liptak, “Supreme Court Gives Religious Schools More
Access to State Aid,” The New York Times, June 30, 2020.
119

See discussion, supra note 11 and accompanying and following

text.
120

Municipal governments and agencies are not wholly independent
governmental agencies but derive their power from the state even if the
state constitution or legislation grants them the power to act
independently.
121

Mo. Const. Art. X, section 18 (state); section 22 (local governments
and agencies).
122

Mo. Const. Art. X, section 23. Zweig v. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer
District, 412 S.W.3d 223, 251-252 (Mo. 2013).
123

Mo. Const. Art. X, section 18(b).

TAX NOTES FEDERAL, AUGUST 24, 2020
®
Electronic
available
at:content,
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3648673
For morecopy
Tax Notes
Federal
please visit www.taxnotes.com.

1457

© 2020 Tax Analysts. All rights reserved. Tax Analysts does not claim copyright in any public domain or third party content.

VIEWPOINT

citations to meet those revenue targets. Level of
enforcement is flexible124 so increasing
enforcement is within police discretion. The
municipal court imposes fines based on the
citations and fees for use of the court and
collateral functions of the court. The relationship
between the offenses and punishment for the
offenses loses significance relative to the revenue125
producing function.
The revenue produced by the fines and court
fees are taxes, not punishments for traffic and
126
other offenses, because their primary function
becomes revenue production rather than
promotion of public safety or punishment of law
127
violators. As taxes they violate the state
constitution because they were enacted under the
police power rather than the taxing power of the
state and voters did not approve them. Although
there has been significant movement in scaling
back the excessive use of fines in Missouri, no
litigation has commenced to challenge the fines
under the constitution’s tax limitations.

but not controlling debate as to permissible
changes in the tax laws.



Conclusion
The Constitution includes many protections
for individual liberties and guarantees due
process of law, equal protection, and separation of
church and state. Where taxes are involved, the
Constitution is rarely a barrier to legislative
decision-making. The Supreme Court as arbiter of
constitutional questions defers to legislative
decisions regarding taxes if they have a rational
state purpose and do not discriminate against outof-state taxpayers. Regarding federal tax
legislation, the Court similarly defers to Congress
and has spoken to constitutional matters only on
limited occasions. Even when the Court has
spoken, the effect of its decision has retreated to
insignificance except as background, informing

124

E.g., an officer may issue a citation for any infraction of a speed
limit but usually there is some tolerance for small infractions. The
amount of tolerance is flexible.
125

Henry Ordower, J.S. Onésimo Sandoval, and Kenneth Warren,
“Out of Ferguson: Misdemeanors, Municipal Courts, Tax Distribution,
and Constitutional Limitations,” 61 Howard L.J. 113 (2017).
126

Id. at 136-142.

127

C.f. National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S.
519 (2012) for an expansive definition of tax to include the shared
responsibility payment under the Affordable Care Act (P.L. 111-148).
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